Atuação do fiscal de contrato: o paradigma entre a economia do dinheiro público e os interesses da empresa contratada.

Abstract

This work was prepared based on a hypothetical situation experienced by a public servant who performs the role of contract inspector, who, after some inquiries and reflections on the possibility of acting with a focus on saving public money and at the same time observing the interests legitimate rights of the company contracted to provide the outsourced services, whether there is the possibility of being held responsible for a crime of administrative improbity or not. Thus, to try to find such an answer, 20 (twenty) contracts signed by the Complexo Hospital de Clínicas of the Federal University of Paraná, a branch of the EBSERH network, will be analyzed with companies providing continuous services, in order to analyze whether there is a difference between the values received by the company that replaced the previous contractor. Finally, it will be analyzed whether the public servant should be penalized for administrative improbity or whether it was sufficient to consider the practical consequences of his decisions to exempt him from any administrative responsibility. Thus, it was found that there is a new tendency to maintain the contract, even if irregularities appear, when they can be remedied without major damage, considering the consequences of the measures adopted. However, the work concludes that some issues deserve more thematic depth, especially the economic analysis of the law under debate.