Da identidade pessoal como continuidade psicológica em John Locke e seus reflexos na responsabilidade criminal no direito penal brasileiro

Abstract

This article aims to investigate the main issues that permeate the philosophical problem of personal identity and it seeks a detailed analysis of the three main theories commonly discussed in the history of philosophy on this subject, namely: the theory of space-time continuity, soul theory and the theory of psychological continuity. It also intended to analyze the main problems pointed out to these three theories, as well as the main changes suffered by them over time and the new theories created to solve the respective problems but based on the lockean theory of psychological continuity. To this end, the contributions of the contemporary philosopher Derek Parfit stand out. To achieve this, the bibliographic research was used, in addition to the hypothetical-deductive method, in order to analyze the theory, construct hypotheses and conjectures, by submitting them to tests and to a wide range of problems pointed out by several philosophers throughout the time, to establish its strength and veracity. Finally, criminal responsibility in current Brazilian criminal law was examined, describing the main differences between this responsibility and the one defended by John Locke in his works, which were based on personal identity as a psychological continuity.